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Fear of an Article V Convention 
 
Arthur H. Taylor 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Article V of the U.S. Constitution provides that, 
 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the 
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall 
call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, 
shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, 
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, 
or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode 
of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress . . . .1
 
As is well known, there are two ways provided to amend the United 
States Constitution. The first is to propose the amendment by the two-
thirds vote of both the House and the Senate. The second is for two-
thirds of the states to call for a convention, with the convention then 
proposing the amendment. In either case, Article V provides that any 
amendment, before effective, shall first be “ratified by the Legislatures of 
three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths 
thereof.”2
All the amendments to the Constitution to date have been proposed 
through Congress. A convention of the states has never been convened. 
Because the second method of proposing amendments has lain dormant 
for over two centuries now, and given some of the legal questions 
surrounding its use, there has grown a substantial fear of an Article V 
convention. This paper examines those fears, identifies their substantive 
content, and then attempts to provide a practical assessment of the real 
risk associated with an Article V convention. 
 
 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 2. Id. 
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II.  AMENDMENT PROCESS 
 
The Constitution expressly provides for two means of amendment. 
There is also a third method, however, which, while not expressly 
provided for, has become a central part of the U.S. Constitutional 
process: to “amend” the Constitution via decision by the United States 
Supreme Court. 
No formal method is required to propose an amendment through the 
Supreme Court. Any litigant may do so. Upon the majority vote of the 
justices, the amendment becomes the “highest law of the land.” While 
the process of changing the Constitution through the judiciary is not 
termed by participants as an amendment, it is substantively the 
equivalent. Currently there is no real challenge to the Court’s authority to 
so act, and all the branches of government, both state and federal, yield 
to and support the changes in the Constitution by the Supreme Court thus 
enacted. 
Two points are useful before giving further review to amendments 
through the judiciary. First, it is conceded that judicial amendments, 
unlike Congressional or convention-based ones, must first find their basis 
in some existing Constitutional language. An amendment proposed in 
Congress or in a convention needs no prior Constitutional reference point 
to justify its proposing. While this distinction is real, over time it has less 
and less significance. Judicial amendments tend to be accretive—that is 
one leads to yet another. So the Constitutional reference point required 
for judicial amendments can be the Constitutional text itself, or as is 
more commonly the case now, a prior Supreme Court interpretation of 
the Constitution. Over time, therefore, the body of potential reference 
points for judicial amendments grows very large. While the judicial 
amending process can tend to be both slower and less noticeable, it is 
every bit as potent. The end result can be essentially identical as though 
an amendment were made into the text of the Constitution itself through 
an Article V Congressional or convention amendment. In fact, in one 
regard a judicial amendment is of even greater authority than a 
Congressional or convention amendment given that the latter must 
survive a first round of judicial interpretation before the basic meaning is 
fully known, whereas a judicial amendment has already endured that 
process at the time of its birth. 
Second, the difference in scope of what may thus be proposed as an 
amendment through Congress or a convention compared to the judiciary 
is hypothetically large, but practically insignificant. The equalizer of the 
two is the political climate of the time. Both means of amendment are 
ultimately dependent on some political support for their position. A 
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Congressional or convention amendment will depend upon the support of 
the people, expressed through various representatives. A judicial 
amendment will depend upon the support of the judges, drawn from the 
citizenry of the country, but generally independent and unaccountable. 
All amendments will require some fundamental popular support. 
Amendments through the judiciary are least dependent on support of the 
people and may actually precede to some degree full societal acceptance. 
Viewed in this context then, the scope of judicial amendments may be 
considered broader than those possible through Congress or a 
convention, rather than the other way around. 
The central point, however, is that the mere hypothetical difference 
in the amending scope of the two processes is largely irrelevant, given 
the political underpinning required of either. An amendment seeking 
birth is far more dependent on finding a “will” than it is on finding a 
“way.” When the “will” or political support is found, the “way” through 
Congress, the States (convention) or the Judiciary can be created. 
In summary then, the requirement that a judicial amendment be 
founded in Constitutional text is minimized as the successive, multiple 
interpretations over time provide ample reference points for the 
proposing of the next judicial amendment. While this might slightly 
decrease the range of amendments which can viably be proposed, the less 
burdensome requirement of popular support necessary for a judicial 
amendment tends to equalize if not more than offset such a constraint. 
Since the Constitution can only be amended through a compound 
process, that is, an amendment to be effective must be both “proposed” 
and “ratified,” the relative ease or difficulty of doing so through one 
process versus another can accurately be assessed only on a compound 
basis as well. 
For ease of reference, amendments through the first two methods—
Congress, and a convention of the states—shall hereafter be referred to 
as “democratic amendments,” since they are subjected fully to the 
American democratic process. Amendments through the third method 
shall be hereafter referred to as “judicial amendments,” since they are 
proposed by litigants and enacted by judges without the vote of elected 
representatives of the people. 
 
III.  AMENDMENT FILTERS 
 
The amendment process might be viewed as one of legal filtering of 
political ideas. Viewed under this model, there are two primary filters 
established before a democratic amendment becomes law. The first filter 
is the amendment proposal. Absent a vote to propose an amendment, 
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there is no authority for any democratic process to approve it and thus it 
cannot become law. Either Congress or a convention of the states must 
act first before any democratic amendment can be enacted. 
The second filter is the States. Whether voiced through the vote of 
the state legislature or a state convention, the assent of three-fourths of 
the states is required for a democratic amendment under Article V. 
These two filters act separately. Either can prevent a political idea 
from becoming a part of the Constitution. They are designed as a dual 
check and balance against ultimately unwise or otherwise harmful 
amendments with momentary popular support. 
A judicial amendment, however, is structured so as to enable 
individual citizens to propose amendments, without filtering. Judicial 
amendments thus effectively have but one filter of any kind in place—
the majority vote of the Supreme Court. While this is not a democratic 
filter, it prevents any proposed amendment from becoming law unless 
the judgment of those appointed to serve as Supreme Court justices agree 
that it is a good idea. 
 
IV.  RISKS OF OVER- OR UNDER-FILTERING 
 
The democratic amendment filters by their nature and design make it 
more difficult for an amendment to be proposed and passed. Over time, 
these filters may tend to over- or under-restrict the volume and kind of 
political ideas which can pass through them. The Founding Fathers felt it 
essential that the Constitution be capable of amendment.3 In fact, through 
the Bill of Rights they immediately proceeded to make such 
amendments. While undoubtedly it can be argued that the Constitution 
should not be amended frequently or easily, it is equally clear that the 
amendment process was intended to be available when and as needed. 
For the purposes of this comment, and for convenience, instead of 
attempting to cite actual, specific, attempted amendments and whether or 
not those amendments should or should not have been adopted, I will 
simply refer to theoretically appropriate amendments as “necessary 
amendments” and theoretically inappropriate amendments as “adverse 
amendments.” 
An analysis of the filtering process will identify two kinds of risk—
the over- and under-filtering of proposed amendments. Over-filtering is 
when necessary amendments are either not proposed or not ratified. That 
is, they are filtered out by one or both of the two filters. Similarly, under-
filtering should be understood as a state where adverse amendments are 
 3. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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both proposed and ratified. The remaining two scenarios, in which 
necessary amendments are both proposed and ratified, or adverse 
amendments are prevented by either filter, are of no consequence for this 
discussion since that is as one would hope it to be. Only the risk of over-
filtering (preventing a necessary amendment), or under-filtering (failing 
to prevent an adverse amendment) are of significance for our purposes. 
Of course, all this discussion so far relates only to democratic 
amendments. But the risk of over- or under-filtering, at least as described 
so far, is measured by the result, not the process. Thus a necessary 
judicial amendment that fails, or an adverse judicial amendment that is 
enacted by the Supreme Court are of the same moment as over- or under-
filtered democratic amendments, at least without regard to the proper 
process or role, democratic or otherwise, for the creation of 
Constitutional amendments. 
While opposite sides of the same coin, the risk of over- and under-
filtering are in fact significantly different. For now, however, my focus is 
on the risk of under-filtering, that is, the failure to prevent enactment of 
an adverse amendment, since this is the predominant fear of an Article V 
convention. 
 
V.  UNDER-FILTERING, A COMPOUND EVENT RISK, 
AND PROBABILITY THEORY 
 
The under-filtering risk of a democratic amendment is a joint 
probability risk. That is, the risk of an adverse democratic amendment 
not being filtered out is the result of two related but separate risks: the 
risk of an adverse democratic amendment being proposed and the risk of 
an adverse democratic amendment being ratified. Both events must occur 
for the risk to be realized. Mathematical probability theory can be 
employed to better explain the true scope and dynamics of this process.4
Probability theory indicates that the likelihood of any event (e3) 
occurring, which is the necessary and sufficient result of two other 
events, e1 and e2, is the product of the same. Where the second event 
occurring is dependent or conditional on the first having already 
occurred, the joint probability is expressed as follows: P(e3) = P(e1) x 
P(e2/e1). Here, P(e3) represents the under-filtering risk of an adverse 
democratic amendment becoming law, P(e1) represents the risk of an 
 4. Mathematical probability theory can here be used to better clarify the comparative 
amendment risks, and specifically identify and measure the added risk, if any, associated with the 
convening of a convention of the states. It should be remembered that the purpose for its use is to 
define and measure the risk of an adverse amendment becoming law in the event a convention “runs 
away.” This is the predominant fear expressed regarding a convention. Carefully applied probability 
theory can both define and measure how great this risk really is. 
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adverse democratic amendment being proposed, and P(e2) represents the 
risk of an adverse democratic amendment being ratified. Put into words, 
this means the probability of an adverse amendment becoming law 
(P(e3)) is equal to the probability that an adverse amendment will be 
proposed (P(e1)) multiplied against the probability that such an 
amendment, if proposed, will then be ratified. This is the mathematical 
equation for the under-filtering risk of an adverse democratic amendment 
(“Under-filtering Risk Equation”). Probability theory also states that 
P(en) < 1, where en represents any event.5 Empowered by this knowledge 
of probability, we can mathematically measure the impact of a “runaway 
convention” on the overall under-filtering risk of an adverse democratic 
amendment becoming law. 
A “runaway convention,” as defined here, shall refer to a convention 
which fails to filter any adverse democratic amendment. In the extreme, 
it represents a scenario where all the delegates of the convention agree to 
vote for each others’ proposed amendments without limitation or 
qualification of any kind. There is no chance that an adverse amendment 
will not be voted worthy of proposal to the States. In terms of the math, 
then, the probability of an adverse amendment being proposed in a 
runaway convention is necessarily equal to one (Lim P(e1) = 1). 
This, however, only defines the limit to the probability of that first 
event (Lim P(e1)), the runaway convention’s proposal to the States of an 
adverse democratic amendment. To determine the impact of a runaway 
convention on P(e3) we need to take the limit of both sides of the Under-
filtering Risk Equation as an Article V convention “runs away”, which 
yields the following: Lim(convention runs away) P(e3) = Lim(convention runs away) P(e1) 
x Lim(convention runs away) P(e2 / e1). To simplify the notation, we will use 
“Law” as a substitute notation for “e3”, “Prop” (proposed) for “e1”, and 
“Ratf” (ratified) for “e2 / e1”. To restate our Under-filtering Risk 
Equation then, we have Lim(convention runs away) P(Law) = Lim(convention runs away) 
P(Prop) x Lim(convention runs away) P(Ratf). Because P(Ratf) is already defined 
as an event conditioned upon the happening of e1, changes in the 
probability of e1 do not impact the probability of P(e2 / e1). Thus the 
Lim(convention runs away) P(e2 / e1) simply equals the P(e2 / e1), or P(Ratf), and is 
unaffected by the fact that the convention ran away. In layman’s terms, 
the running away of a convention does not have an impact on the 
probability of an amendment being ratified once proposed. 
Simplifying the under-filtering risk equation with the limit of both 
sides as a convention runs away therefore yields the following: 
Lim(convention runs away) P(e3) = 1 x P(e2 / e1). Simplifying further, Lim(convention 
 
 5. In other words, the probability of an event’s occurrence is no higher than 100%. 
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runs away) P(e3) = P(e2 / e1) = P(Ratf). This reveals to us the obvious, that the 
probability of an adverse amendment becoming law in the event a 
convention “runs away” is the probability that the amendment is then 
ratified. 
So, through use of probability theory and limits, we can measure the 
under-filtering risk of an adverse democratic amendment becoming law, 
assuming that a convention runs away, as equal to P(Ratf), which is the 
probability that it is then ratified. 
By comparison, the judicial under-filtering risk of an adverse 
amendment is simply P(e4), where e4 represents the event of the Supreme 
Court deciding in favor of an adverse judicial amendment to the 
Constitution. This is so because there is no filter with the Supreme Court 
in terms of what can be proposed as a judicial amendment. Anything can 
be proposed, but it will have no impact unless the Supreme Court decides 
to adopt the amendment. To be sure, this vote may require several 
separate actions by the Supreme Court, such as granting certiorari, 
supporting standing, and ultimately ruling favorably on the merits. 
In summary, then, the under-filtering risk of an adverse democratic 
amendment—with a runaway convention—is measured as P(e2 / e1), or 
P(Ratf), the likelihood that the States will ratify an adverse amendment, 
while the under-filtering risk of a judicial amendment is measured as 
P(e4), the likelihood that the Supreme Court will decide in favor of an 
adverse judicial amendment. (Of course, if a convention does not 
runaway, then the under-filtering risk of an adverse democratic 
amendment remains at P(e1) x P(Ratf), where P(e1) remains the 
probability of an adverse democratic amendment being proposed by a 
convention.) 
A couple of examples will highlight the comparative risks of P(Ratf) 
and P(e4). Let us assume that the recent decision in Lawrence v. Texas6 
constitutes an adverse judicial amendment establishing a U.S. 
Constitutional right to engage in private, consensual sodomy.7 This, then, 
was an amendment proposed by Lawrence without filtering.8 The risk, 
 6. 595 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 7. “Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in 
their conduct without intervention of the government.” Id. at 575 (2003). 
 8. The openness of the courts to judicial constitutional amendments based on a single 
individual’s “search for greater freedom” couldn’t have been stated more plainly than it was in 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575 (2003). “Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in 
its manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to have this 
insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later generations can see that laws once 
thought necessary and proper in fact serve only to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in 
every generation can invoke its principles in their own search for greater freedom.” 
As indicated earlier, some argue that the scope of an adverse amendment, where only interpretive 
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before the Supreme Court actually decided that such a judicial 
amendment would be approved, is denoted as P(e4)(private, consensual sodomy 
protected). Assuming a runaway convention at the extreme, and that a 
private, consensual sodomy amendment, equal in scope and content as 
the Lawrence holding, is approved at the convention, then the risk that 
this democratic amendment would be approved is P(Ratf) (private, consensual 
sodomy protected). The key question in this example, assuming a runaway 
convention, then, becomes this: which risk is greater, P(e4)(private, consensual 
sodomy protected), or P(Ratf) (private, consensual sodomy protected)? Is it more likely the 
Supreme Court would approve such an amendment, or three-fourths of 
the States? Of course, in this case we have the benefit of hind-sight to 
conclude that it is probably substantially more likely that the Supreme 
Court would approve such an amendment than would the States, even 
with a runaway convention. 
What if we take a hypothetical that has not yet been decided? What 
of a U.S. Constitutional amendment ensuring gays and lesbians the right 
to marry? Which seems greater, the risk that the Supreme Court would 
approve such an amendment proposed by litigants, P(e4)(gay and lesbian marriage 
protected), or the risk that three-fourths of state legislatures would approve 
such an amendment proposed by a runaway convention P(Ratf)(gay and 
lesbian marriage protected)? 
In both cases one would probably conclude that the current risk of an 
adverse judicial amendment is much higher than the risk of an adverse 
democratic amendment, even with a runaway convention that filters no 
amendments of any kind. Of course, if the convention did filter some 
amendments—if it was not a runaway convention—then the comparative 
risk of an adverse judicial amendment would be even greater. 
The whole point is that the significance of a runaway convention, 
assuming that one should ever occur, has been vastly overstated. 
Practically speaking, a runaway convention means at the extreme that 
one of two filters is eliminated, and that the risk of an adverse democratic 
amendment has increased—at the very most—to equal the risk that the 
States would ratify such an amendment. This risk in the current political 
climate is—depending on one’s political view and definition of an 
adverse amendment—still, by comparison, substantially lower than the 
risk of an adverse judicial amendment. Furthermore, because 
changes are being made, is less than the scope of an adverse amendment where the text itself may be 
changed. The perimeter of interpretive changes however, is self-expanding. As Lawrence 
demonstrates, one interpretation enables another and yet another. Given ample time, the perimeters 
have opportunity to be essentially equal in scope. The real difference, then, is not the scope of 
potential amendments that can be made, whether through the democratic or judicial process, but 
whether one can be made quickly in a few years through a democratic amendment, or more slowly 
but ever as surely given decades of accretive judicial decisions. 
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amendments “proposed” through the judiciary have the same 
characteristics of a runaway convention (i.e., any and all amendments 
may be proposed) the convening of a modern-day convention will do 
little more to put the Constitution at risk than the advent of modern-day 
judicial activism has already done. Said another way, through judicial 
activism we already have all the risks of a convention but none of the 
benefits. Only if one believes it is more likely that three-fourths of the 
states will ratify an adverse democratic amendment than it is that five 
justices will approve an identical adverse judicial amendment should 
there exist a fear of a convention. 
The rational fear, if any, of a convention should be reduced to this: 
Those who believe three-fourths of the States are more likely than the 
Supreme Court to approve an adverse amendment should legitimately 
fear an Article V convention. Conversely, those who believe three-
fourths of the States are more likely than the Supreme Court to approve 
needed amendments should favor an Article V convention. The debate to 
date has been misrepresented as consisting of either the retention or 
abandonment of the first filter to prevent the proposal of an adverse 
amendment. That debate ignores the fact that our system already includes 
a wide-open amendment proposing process through the judiciary. 
Continuing the debate of a filtered versus non-filtered process for 
proposing amendments is clearly outdated. The process for proposing 
amendments to the U.S. Constitution is now wide-open. The typical way 
of analyzing an Article V convention is premised upon the explicit two-
pronged method for amending the Constitution set forth in Article V. The 
amendment process through the judiciary, however, is just as real and 
widely accepted (that is, legally followed). Once one concedes that there 
are three legal means of amending the Constitution, the analysis of an 
Article V convention dramatically changes. 
The real debate then is not one regarding what a convention could or 
would propose, but who should effect the ratification of any amendment: 
the Supreme Court or three-fourths of the States? Those relentlessly 
holding to their fears of an Article V convention are principally of two 
groups: (1) those who actually prefer the Supreme Court as the 
amendment ratifying body, and (2) those who oppose judicial activism, 
but seem to be in political and legal denial, hoping for some undefined 
and undeveloped resolution of their fears of judicial activism. This latter 
group, while opposing a convention of the states, nonetheless proffers no 
practical solution to the problem of judicial amendments. Conversely, 
those favoring an Article V convention are either (1) those who prefer 
the States as the appropriate ratifying body, or (2) those who criticize, yet 
concede that the Supreme Court has now become the Supreme Branch. 
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This second group also maintains that an Article V convention is the only 
remaining check provided to the States against a runaway Federal 
government. Under our current system of constitutional jurisprudence, 
the rational fear, if any, of an Article V convention should be 
predominantly political, not legal. 
The unwitting consequence of this fear, regardless of its origin, is to 
provide support for the political base preferring preservation of the 
current ratification authority of the Supreme Court. Whether clothed in 
political opposition, or unreasoned denials of current Constitutional 
reality, fear of an Article V convention inadvertently strengthens the 
power of the Supreme Court, and lessens the power of the States. 
 
VI.  DEFINITION OF ADVERSE AMENDMENT 
 
The notion of an “adverse amendment” deserves further discussion. 
While I have developed the term and referenced it for a purpose, I should 
now discuss just what such a phrase means and the significance of its 
use. To whom is an “adverse amendment” adverse? It is certainly 
adverse to those who oppose it. Is it adverse to Congress, or to the 
Supreme Court? Is it adverse to the Federal government or to the States? 
Or is it in fact adverse to the people themselves? Should an amendment 
be termed “adverse” based on its political content, or more based on the 
process that enabled it to come into being? 
If political ideology itself is not the basis for determining an 
amendment to be “adverse,” then what democratic amendment, ratified 
by three-fourths of the state legislatures, can or should rightly be termed 
adverse in any instance? Unanswered questions in this arena abound. If it 
is adverse even when ratified by three-fourths, is it still adverse if ratified 
by four-fifths, or by every state legislature? It seems that the line 
between individual rights and democratic rule was determined by the 
early framers to be at a three-fourths level of ratification. Under a 
republican government, which amendments favored by a super-majority 
of the people should the people be allowed to have? Have we now 
moved to a system of jurisprudence not only acquiescing to judicial 
amendments but actually favoring them? How can a system of 
constitutional government “by the people, for the people, and of the 
people” remain democratic when constitutional action taken by the States 
and the people, such as an Article V Convention, is not only restrained, 
but also loathed? Is a democracy that appeals to the government to 
protect the Constitution from the people safer than one that appeals to the 
people to protect the Constitution from the government? Rarely is any 
government in better form than are its people in their character, but there 
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are many occasions when the people are much better than their current 
form of government. 
Without delving into a detailed review of minority and majority 
rights, the point is that, depending on the definition of an “adverse 
amendment,” one may favor an Article V convention for political values 
more aligned with the substantive view of the States and the people, or 
for political values more aligned with the procedural view of self-
government. Those defining any “adverse amendment” as one not 
consistent with simple notions of self-government, albeit with 
appropriate respect for minority rights, are likely to find substantially 
higher risk of an adverse amendment through the judiciary than with the 
States and the people. In either case, whether one’s view is primarily 
substantively or procedurally based, the precise reason for individuals 
fearing or favoring an Article V convention should be segregated, since 
the implications are significant and inescapable on both substantive and 
procedural fronts. 
 
VII.  FEAR OF ANY AMENDMENT 
 
Another fear of an Article V convention comes from those who are 
afraid it would succeed. That is, they believe it would successfully 
propose necessary amendments which would then be ratified by three-
fourths of the States. The cause of this fear, however, is in the definition 
of a “necessary amendment.” To this group, no amendment is necessary. 
This position is taken irrespective of the substance of the amendment. It 
is a blind, total rejection of any amending of the Constitution. It is 
sometimes advocated even on religious grounds. 
The weaknesses in this position are that it is (1) substantively blind, 
(2) inherently contradictory, and (3) rationally inconsistent with the 
existence of judicial amendments. First, to reject all amendments, 
regardless of substance, is to presuppose a static nature to society, 
technology, and the world itself. Those opposing an Article V convention 
as but one means of opposing any amendment assume that the original 
language can be stretched and applied to fit all evolving circumstances. 
On the one hand they favor judicial application of original intent to 
evolving circumstances in a conservative but elastic way, while on the 
other hand they eschew judicial amendments as having gone too far. 
Thus they hold an unrealistic expectation that original intent should be 
applied, but at the same time original intent must be stretched to 
accommodate a changing nation and society (e.g., revolutions in 
telecommunications, transportation, and technologies). Yet they hold that 
in no case should the Constitution actually be amended, either 
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democratically or “judicially.” 
Furthermore, the religious belief some espouse is internally 
inconsistent as well. Holding the Constitution to be divinely inspired, 
they nonetheless reject all provisions and purposes within the 
Constitution for its amendment, as well as any possible virtue to an 
Article V convention itself. Consequently, in their view, the document is 
inspired, but with exceptions, namely Article V, and the Bill of Rights. 
Everything else, in their view, was definitely inspired. 
Those who advocate opposition to all democratic amendments in the 
face of judicial amendments defy reason. Even if it is believed that the 
Constitution should never be amended, if it is amended, one would 
expect a desire to change it back. Most judicial amendments can only be 
changed, if ever, by a democratic amendment. The second, democratic 
amendment simply reverses the effect of the judicial amendment—
actually drawing closer to the position desired by those who initially 
reject all amendments. Opposing democratic amendments, including 
those from an Article V convention, in the face of regular and ongoing 
judicial amendments, comports with no rationally consistent set of 
beliefs. It simply defies all reasoning. 
The religious opposition to an Article V convention is often masked 
behind other grounds, ostensibly more acceptable to defend. The 
emptiness of the view is easily revealed, however, by first identifying 
whether any amendment for any reason, whether judicial or democratic, 
is acceptable. If not, then the alleged fear of an Article V convention can 
be easily dismissed as simply a redecorated position which, in reality 
opposes all amendments all the time regardless of how proposed. 
 
VIII.  FEAR OF THE PEOPLE 
 
Lastly, there are those who selectively favor amending the 
Constitution, who prefer it to be done democratically, but fear the people. 
The sum of their position is that an Article V convention should not be 
held because the first Congressional filter is essential. As already 
discussed, this position only makes sense, if at all, when the amendment 
process is limited to the methods described in Article V and excludes the 
possibility of “judicial amendment.” The filterless ability of the Supreme 
Court to amend the Constitution renders this track of analysis moot. The 
choice is not whether to preserve a two-filter system, which no longer 
exists. Rather, the choice is between which body should have ratifying 
authority over any amendment—the Supreme Court or the States? If an 
Article V convention also restricts some undesirable amendments from 
being voted on, then all the better. But if not, the result is inconsequential 
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in the face of the Supreme Court’s apparent ability to ratify myriad 
litigant-proposed amendments. 
Still, some choose this course of reasoning because in the end they 
conclude that the wisdom of the Supreme Court justices really is 
preferable to the gullibility of the American people.9 However, a simple 
survey of the American people’s view of potential amendments will give 
a clear indication of just how “gullible” they are, or are not. These survey 
results10 directly challenge the assumption that a convention could lead 
to a radical restructuring of the Bill of Rights. The argument is simply 
political fiction, but has for years been a powerful rallying point for those 
opposing a convention. The survey shows a current snap-shot view of 
where the American people stand on assorted amendment possibilities, 
and leave to those questioning the voters’ intelligence to explain how and 
when a sudden dramatic shift will occur. 
 
IX.  SURVEY OF AMERICAN VIEWS ON U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL 
AMENDMENTS 
 
While the survey, scientific in its exposé of where the voters 
currently stand, certainly does not foreclose shifts in voter sentiments, it 
does nonetheless reveal as largely political fear-mongering the position 
of those suggesting American voters and their state legislators are even 
remotely likely to vitiate cherished constitutional rights. If such far-
fetched fears are not extinguished, at a minimum the burden of proof 
powerfully shifts to the fearful to provide any credible evidence their 
cherished phobia is rooted in reality. The fear itself seems to entirely 
discount our vibrant free-speech society which would adamantly oppose 
such changes. Furthermore, it affronts the basic underpinnings of Anglo-
American constitutional government as expressed by George 
Washington, “[t]he Constitution—its only keepers, the People.” When 
the voice of the people is feared, democracies die. In the end, the 
Constitution is as much about the people and the process as it is about 
any particular provision. The importance of people choosing in a 
democracy was warned of by statesman Ezra Taft Benson, who said, “To 
all who have discerning eyes, it is apparent that the republican form of 
government established by our noble forefathers cannot long endure once 
fundamental principles are abandoned . . . . The issue is . . . will men be 
free to determine their own course of action or must they be coerced?”11
 
 9. See Appendix A. 
 10. See Appendix A. 
 11. EZRA TAFT BENSON, THE CONSTITUTION: A HEAVENLY BANNER 31 (1986). 
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X.  FEAR OF A POWER SHIFT 
 
Given that the Constitution is the “highest law of the land,”12 any 
change in the amendment process potentially shifts significant power. 
The convening of an Article V convention would significantly rupture 
the current allocation of governmental powers. The activation of a State-
based method of amending the Constitution strips Congress of what, in 
practice, has been its exclusive domain. The power-shift over the years 
from the States to the Federal government has been gradual but 
significant.13 The Tenth Amendment, not surprisingly, has been whittled 
throughout this process to a mostly hollow shell,14 devoid of anything 
near the reservation of power to the States and the People its language 
intuitively implies. 
The Supreme Court is openly acknowledged as the Supreme Branch. 
The relationship which has evolved between the Judiciary, Legislative, 
and Executive branches has resulted in almost no post-facto check on 
decisions by the Court. While the Supreme Court’s constitutional 
authority is not completely unfettered, in combination with a meaningful 
minority in the Senate, it is practically so. 
The convening of a convention of the States would thus rupture long-
standing and respected allocations of core power in this country. It would 
inevitably lead to a major shift in constitutional power from the federal 
government to the States—both immediately and prospectively as the 
States reenter the negotiations on future constitutional issues. The power 
of a minority of senators will become limited, and particularly less 
significant in matters of deep emotional interest to the people. Most of 
all, the Supreme Court will lose its untouchable status on constitutional 
issues. While it is unclear whether a convention would deal only with 
substantive issues important to the States and the people, or will address 
the core judicial activism issue itself, in either instance the power of the 
Supreme Court to amend the Constitution in a very unpopular way, while 
safely protected on their political flank by a minority of senators, will be 
stripped forever. 
The net effect of an idling Article V state-based convention authority 
has been to feed an ever-growing federal government by shifting 
significant authority from the states to Washington. This has also created, 
 12. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 13. See KENNETH R. THOMAS, FEDERALISM, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE CONSTITUTION: 
BASIS AND LIMITS OF CONGRESSIONAL POWER (Congressional Research Service 2005), available at 
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL30315.pdf (last visited Apr. 6, 2006). 
 14. See, e.g., id. at 21 (reviewing recent Supreme Court decisions strengthening state 
sovereignty). 
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greater distance between decisions of democracy and the people, and 
enabled judicial activism to take root, bloom, and grow unchecked by the 
ultimate authority and right of the people and the states to self 
government. Article V was intended to prevent just such a runaway 
federal government and its many attendant evils.15
This inevitable shift in power has been predictable and remains a 
certain basis for fear—political fear—of an Article V convention. 
However, few if any affected are likely to articulate their fear in terms of 
a power loss. As with those who oppose any amendment, the rationale of 
those in power who fear the States’ exercise of their Article V 
amendment power should be viewed with suspicion. So likewise should 
those who seem particularly dependent on judicial amendments as a 
substitute for political success in the traditional democratic process be 
suspect. 
 
XI.  EXTRA-ARTICLE V CONVENTION FEARS 
 
The fears discussed so far relate to an Article V convention. Some 
fears, however, are more appropriately classified as “common law 
convention fears.”16 That is, they represent fears of what a convention 
might or might not have authority to do notwithstanding the language of 
Article V. Given the probability analysis above, however, fears regarding 
how a convention might act and propose amendments is rendered largely 
inconsequential. That is, accepting and measuring the risks of a runaway 
convention has already been factored in. 
The only fear not already considered or measured is the fear that a 
convention, despite the clear language of Article V, might change the 
ratification requirements, thus rendering the above analysis incomplete.17 
 15. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 85 (Alexander Hamilton) (highlighting this check and 
balance between the state and the federal governments). 
 16. This phrase is intended to capture fears attributed to the inherent power of a convention 
that may be either not spoken to or directly contradicted by Article V. This mostly undefined body of 
authority is often cited as a basis to fear a convention even when Article V specifies means or limits 
preventing the evil hypothesized. 
 17. See, e.g., CON CON: Playing Russian Roulette with the Constitution, PHYLLIS SCHLAFLY 
REP., Dec. 1984, available at http://www.eagleforum.org/psr/1984/dec84/psrdec84.html (“None of 
[the eight postulated] ‘checks’ [to prevent a runaway constitutional convention] stands up as a 
safeguard in which we can place any confidence. . . . [The eighth safeguard is that t]hirty-eight states 
must ratify. That is not necessarily true. A runaway [constitutional convention] could change the 
ratification requirements (as the 1787 Constitutional Convention did). Also, Article V gives 
Congress the power to specify that state ratifications must take place by conventions, thereby 
bypassing the State Legislatures altogether.”); see also Robert W. Lee, Battling for the Constitution, 
JOHN BIRCH SOCIETY, Apr. 26, 1999, http://www.jbs.org/artman/publish/article_194.shtml (quoting 
the 1911 assertion of Senator Heyburn of Idaho that “[w]hen the people of the United States meet in 
a constitutional convention there is no power to limit their action. They are greater than the 
Constitution, and they can repeal the provision that limits the right of amendment. They can repeal 
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Even these fears, however, when examined with greater scrutiny, reveal 
their weak underpinning. There are several reasons why. 
First, the suggestion that the founding convention changed the 
ratification requirements is unwarranted. It would be more accurate to 
say that they proposed that Congress change the ratification 
requirements.18 There is nothing in the action of the convention which 
presumed to unilaterally, without Congressional action, alter the 
ratification requirement of the Articles of Confederation from unanimous 
approval by the thirteen states to require only nine. It is not that Article 
VII of the drafted constitution didn’t make a change—it did. It’s that in 
doing so, the Convention fully recognized that only Congress could, with 
authority, present the change in ratification to the States. In his final 
speech to the Convention, Benjamin Franklin plainly referred to the fact 
that their action was subject both to congressional approval and 
ratification by the states.19 The subsequent debate in Congress evidenced 
the same view as well.20
every section of it because they are the peers of the people who made it.”). Senator Heyburn, like 
many others, clearly confuses the power to propose changes with the power to make changes. Id. 
There is no American experience with the latter, and recorded history shows the former was clearly 
contingent on both affirmative congressional and state action. 
 18. See INDEX: JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789 (Kenneth E. Harris 
& Steven D. Tilley eds., 1976). The Journals of Congress record the debate that ensued September 
26 and 27, 1787, when the Constitution was reported back by the original convention to the 
Continental Congress for action. The record clearly shows that (1) no one suggested that the 
convention’s draft of the Constitution was an authoritative change to the Articles of Confederation—
all recognized it as merely a proposal; (2) no one suggested that the convention action was 
authoritative and binding without Congressional action—all the debate centered around the decision 
of whether Congress should vote to pass the draft Constitution onto the states, and whether to do so 
with or without an affirmative or negative endorsement; (3) there was debate threatening to vote 
against such action; and (4) there was consideration of whether the convention properly had 
authority to propose a change in the ratification requirements. 
The debate centered around two distinguishable propositions: (1) should the Congress endorse, 
disapprove, find the lacked authority to do either, or remain silent regarding their own view of the 
merits of the new Constitution; and (2), should they vote to transmit the new Constitution to the 
states for ratification in its entirety, part by part as they saw fit, with or without additional 
amendments, whether such amendments would be advisory only, and whether Congress must act 
upon identical language to that of the Convention. In the end, issues were resolved by rejecting all 
options except to remain silent, and transmit the new Constitution to the States for ratification, only 
in the whole, without any amendments, and with the identical language of the Convention left in 
place. These decisions, embodied in the final resolution which passed, caused an earlier proposed 
finding that Congress lacked authority to either endorse or oppose the draft Constitution because of 
the change in ratification requirements to fail. And no amendment of any kind, including one which 
might change back the ratification requirement from nine to thirteen, to ever be offered or 
considered. 
 19. James Madison, Monday Sept. 17, 1787, in 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 641 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). 
 20. James Madison specifically hypothesized the result of any congressional amendment to 
the draft, arguing that while the Convention directly represented the People, a Congressional 
amendment would fatally destroy prospects for ratification. He suggested that Congress had the 
authority to do so, but that an amendment “excludes [the] Convention entirely” because the result 
  
407] FEAR OF AN ARTICLE V CONVENTION 423 
 
So the Convention didn’t change the ratification requirement, it 
simply proposed a change to Congress, who authorized consideration of 
the change to the States21 where nine states ultimately agreed.22 So the 
scope of the fear based on precedence should not be that a convention 
itself might change the ratification requirements, but that Congress might 
endorse a proposed change in such requirements. 
Furthermore, Article V retains Congressional control over the 
ratification procedure itself. Again it is typically suggested that Congress 
chooses the mode of ratification, whether it be by state legislature or by 
state convention. This also is inaccurate—or at least incomplete—since 
Article V states, in relevant part, that, 
The Congress . . . shall propose amendments to this Constitution, 
or . . . shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either 
case, shall be valid . . . when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths 
of the several states, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the 
one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by the 
Congress . . . .23
The authority given Congress is not only to specify whether state 
legislatures or state conventions ratify an amendment, but whether 
“legislatures of three fourths of the several states” or “conventions in 
three fourths thereof” shall perform the ratification. Congress not only 
specifies the body to ratify, but the required level of ratification as 
well—set at three fourths. 
There is no judicial precedent to suggest that the States, already 
bound by constitutional agreement one to another, have the authority to 
abrogate that agreement by their own action without the consent of the 
Congress. Congress consented then, and it would have to consent now, to 
would then not be a dual act of both groups, and the result would “[confine] the House in the 
trammels of the Confederation.” See THE FOUNDER’S CONSTITUTION, Vol. 1, Ch. 6, Doc. 12 (Univ. 
of Chicago Press), at http://press-pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/v1ch6s12.html. 
This very negative assessment seems to foreclose the obvious alternative of simply bypassing 
Congress altogether and submitting the draft Constitution directly to the States, should that in fact 
have been an option. No one directly or indirectly suggested it was. This apparent view of Madison 
matches with the representation of Richard Henry Lee, that “It is admitted and [a] fact that this 
[Constitution] was to be sent to Congress . . . .” See id. In all the rough and tumble of debate, no one 
suggested in either word or deed that the Convention had a direct route to state ratification bypassing 
Congress. At every step of the way Congressional action transmitting the new Constitution to the 
States for ratification, with or without endorsement, was considered a required step and became the 
object of substantial debate. 
 21. See INDEX: JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789 (Kenneth E. Harris 
& Steven D. Tilley eds., 1976). 
 22. Eleven states, all but North Carolina and Rhode Island, actually ratified the Constitution 
before Congress acted upon the ratifications on September 13, 1788, and began forming the new 
government. 
 23. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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any future change. In fact, Congress could choose to withhold 
specification of the means of ratification until after an Article V 
convention actually proposes an amendment. While they must specify a 
means, there is no requirement that they do so in advance, nor have they 
done so in advance of proposing amendments themselves. By 
withholding specification of the ratification method until after an 
amendment is proposed, they thus retain the authority, granted by the 
language of Article V to reject fully any change in the ratification 
process. 
The fear, if any, should then rightfully be directed towards Congress, 
which, given the significant loss of exclusive power to propose 
democratic amendments, is unlikely to appease generously any such 
change proposed by the States. The fear that a convention would change 
the ratification requirements thus neglects the evidence of history, defies 
the express language of Article V, and is based on an un-cited and 
unprecedented view of common law convention authority never before 
exercised in our nation’s history. 
In fact, to be historically accurate, the proposed Constitution together 
with the Bill of Rights was ultimately ratified by all thirteen States—just 
as required by Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation.24 So in any 
instance the debate is moot. The real issue, is the validity of the 
Constitution between the time it was ratified by New Hampshire (the 
ninth) and Rhode Island (the thirteenth). 
 
XII.  CONGRESSIONAL ACTION 
 
While the Convention did not act unilaterally or change the 
ratification requirement itself, there remains a related but different 
question of whether Congress had the authority to do what it did—both 
in sending the draft Constitution to the states for ratification, and in 
forming the new government once nine states had ratified the same. 
Whether Congress, upon recommendation of the Convention and the 
approval of nine states, had authority to change the ratification 
requirement under Article XIII of the Articles of Confederation was itself 
a justiciable constitutional issue, subject to the review of the highest 
court in the land. The highest court in the land at the time could decide 
with finality, once and for all, whether such action was constitutional 
under the Articles of Confederation or not. According to Article XIII 
itself, however, the highest judicial body, or court of law, was the 
Congress itself: “Every State shall abide by the determination of the 
 24. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. XIII. 
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United States in Congress assembled, on all questions which by this 
confederation are submitted to them.”25 In addition to exercising their 
legislative authority to review the proposed ratification change by the 
Convention, the Congress could—and did—act as judge and jury on the 
issue in exercise of their plenary judicial authority as well. 
The motion and charge against the ratification change was made by 
Richard Henry Lee, and seconded by Melancton Smith. The question 
submitted to the Congress was whether it had authority under the 
Articles of Confederation, Article XIII, to facilitate creation of a new 
confederacy of nine states, or whether its authority was limited to merely 
amending the Articles by the unanimous approval of all thirteen states. 
Specifically, the Congressional Court was asked to “find that the said 
Constitution in the thirteenth article thereof limits the power of Congress 
to the amendment of the present Confederacy of thirteen states, but does 
not extend it to the creation of a new confederacy of nine states.”26
With whatever limited debate that occurred, those arguing in favor of 
the congressional power to facilitate a confederacy of just nine states by 
state ratification made a motion to effectively dismiss the case by 
postponing its consideration. They prevailed, and the motion and charge 
against the ratification requirement change was lost. 
That position of the Congressional Court was followed later when 
Congress, upon ratification by nine states and further joined in the debate 
interim by two more states, exercised the very authority questioned by 
Lee and Smith. Thus on September 13, 1788, Congress proceeded to 
form the new government under the new Constitution.27
 25. Id. Without separate branches of government, the Articles vested Congress with both 
legislative and judicial responsibility and authority. 
 26. INDEX: JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, 1774-1789 (Kenneth E. Harris & 
Steven D. Tilley eds., 1976) (citing PAPERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS, No. 36, III, at 377 
(September 26, 1787 notes of Richard Henry Lee)). 
 27. The resolution authorizing the formation of the new government, following months of 
debate (mostly over where the new government should be headquartered) was finally approved by 
Congress on September 13, 1788, as recorded in the Journals of Congress: “So it was resolved as 
follows, 
Whereas the Convention assembled in Philadelphia pursuant to the resolution of 
Congress of the 21st of Feby, 1787 did on the 17th of Sept of the same year report to the 
United States in Congress assembled a constitution for the people of the United States, 
whereupon Congress on the 28 of the same Sept did resolve unanimously ‘That the said 
report with the resolutions and letter accompanying the same be transmitted to the several 
legislatures in order to be submitted to a convention of Delegates chosen in each state by 
[The following resolution on the organization of the government under the Constitution 
was entered by Benjamin Bankson in Ratifications of the Constitution, pp. 180-181. 
Broadsides of this resolution, signed by Charles Thomson, are in Papers of the 
Continental Congress, Broadsides.] the people thereof in conformity to the resolves of the 
convention made and provided in that case’ And whereas the constitution so reported by 
the Convention and by Congress transmitted to the several legislatures has been ratified 
in the manner therein declared to be sufficient for the establishment of the same and such 
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The judgment rendered by the Congressional Court was clearly 
permissive of the ratification change, notwithstanding the contrary 
motion of Lee and Smith. Whether the decision was a well-reasoned 
interpretation of Article XIII or an overt act of judicial activism can still 
be fodder for ongoing debate. What should not be the subject of dispute, 
however, is that Congress was vested by the Articles of Confederation 
with plenary judicial authority to decide the issue with finality, and that 
they did so.28
The Founding Fathers were obviously fortunate to gain such 
cooperation from a Congress serving as both the legislative and judicial 
branch of government, whereas proponents of a convention today would 
be politically foolish to count on such similar support from either, much 
less both, the Congress and the Supreme Court. 
 
XIII.  RATIFICATION REQUIREMENT SUMMARY 
 
In review, the Convention merely proposed the ratification change—
they did nothing more. Congress, who had authority to reject it, with 
either its legislative or judicial authority, instead enabled and ultimately 
endorsed it as an exercise of both. Even if the judicial authority of 
Congress under Article XIII were somehow challenged, the outer edge of 
those arguing against the ratification is that the Congress, who was 
revolutionary in 1776, was in a slight degree still so in 1788, and that the 
revolution was actually two-step as opposed to one-step. None of these 
positions imperil or impugn the authority or actions of the Convention 
then, nor provide a basis for fearing the actions of another convention 
today. 
Finally, it is important to note that the impetus for even proposing a 
change in the ratification process is vastly different from then until now. 
All democratic constitutions historically are based on the notion of super-
majority consent. Changing ratification from 100% to 75% still accepted 
the premise of a required super-majority. To what would a convention 
today change the standard? To fifty-one percent? To two thirds? Why 
ratifications duly authenticated have been received by Congress and are filed in the 
Office of the Secretary therefore Resolved That the first Wednesday in Jany next be the 
day for appointing Electors in the several states, which before the said day shall have 
ratified the said constitution; that the first Wednesday in feby next be the day for the 
electors to assemble in their respective states and vote for a president; and that the first 
Wednesday in March next be the time and the present seat of Congress the place for 
commencing proceedings under the said constitution. 
 28. Those challenging this result have mistakenly turned their focus on the Convention itself 
for proposing the change, rather than on Congress for at least twice enabling if not endorsing the 
ratification change; and in no case have those objecting to the result challenged Congress’ judicial 
authority under Article XIII to determine with finality the question. 
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would they consider doing so at the risk of having Congress deny even 
submitting the amendments to the states under its Article V authority 
requiring that they specify the mode of ratification by three fourths or at 
the expense of a successfully constructed challenge to the amendment’s 
validity presented to a Supreme Court most disgorged of power by the 
process? All this—as well as the potential scorn of the States and the 
people themselves—would be engaged merely to reduce the ratifying 
requirement from, let us suppose, 38 (three fourths) to 34 (two thirds), 
and necessarily undertaken at the very outset of the amendment process 
rather than at the tail end when their inability to secure the final four 
ratification votes is most likely to be ascertained. 
Not only would a proposed change in the ratification standard 
require the assent of both Congress and the Supreme Court, but it would 
also entail a political gamble vastly more risky than that encompassed in 
the actions of the original convention. 
 
XIV.  CONCLUSION 
 
There are several fears of an Article V convention, but only one—a 
straight forward political fear—appears rational. The most predominant 
fear is that it will “run away,” but as indicated and measured with 
probability theory above, such an event is inconsequential given the 
reality of our three-pronged method for amending the Constitution. It is 
feared by those who do not want to see any amendment to the 
Constitution, and those who criticize an Article V convention out of 
concern that, in fact, it could succeed, even to the extent of opposing 
democratic amendments simply reversing judicial amendments. It is 
feared by those who do want to amend the Constitution as needed, but 
believe the gullibility of the American people is such that cherished 
Constitutional freedoms would be lost. This group ignores current 
political reality, as shown in Appendix A, that no such public sentiment 
is anywhere on the horizon. They premise their position, even in the 
advent of free speech, talk radio, internet, and multiple electronic and 
paper media outlets, upon the idea that the wisdom of the Supreme Court 
is more secure than the heart of the American voter. They premise their 
defense of democracy and Constitutional rights not in the people but in 
its highest instruments of government—a patronizing, parental, and 
insulting approach to democracy, eerily reminiscent of theories 
underlying governments of remarkably less freedom. 
There are those who fear an Article V convention because of the 
shift in power it will inevitably produce away from the federal 
government and particularly the Supreme Court back to the States. There 
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are also those who oppose the convention, whether Article V or 
otherwise, because of the prospect that the ratification requirements 
might be changed in a convention contrary to the specific language of 
Article V. In doing so, however, they misread convention history as 
changing the ratification standard unilaterally as opposed to 
recommending that Congress and the States do so. The Congress, in 
exercise of both its legislative and judicial powers under the Articles of 
Confederation to determine “all questions . . . submitted to them,” 
including this one, decided to assent to the change being considered and 
voted upon by the states—all of whom over time ratified both the change 
as well as the Constitution, and ultimately fully satisfying the 
requirement of unanimous ratification anyway. 
The likelihood of a change in ratification requirements today is quite 
remote given the gap in interests between the States and Congress and 
the Supreme Court which would, by precedent, be the necessary 
determiners of the question. Furthermore, Congress can simply veto the 
submission to the States of an amendment with a purported change in 
ratification standards under existing Article V language. The legal and 
political barriers to such a change today are thus formidable. 
There is, however, one supportable reason to oppose an Article V 
convention—if one prefers the political leaning of the judiciary to that of 
the States. This is the only rational reason under the current 
circumstances. Conversely, those who favor vesting or exercising the 
already vested amendment power in the States, and those who prefer and 
trust their political leanings more than those of the judiciary, should be 
among an Article V convention’s greatest advocates. They clearly have 
the most to gain. 
One thing is for certain: An Article V convention will produce 
political winners and political losers. It will be a monumental battle for 
authority and power in this country. It can reshape the future course of 
our nation and the Constitution as we now know it. It seems to have 
predictable and persuasive potential for favoring States’ rights and the 
more conservative state agendas. It is, practically speaking, the only 
viable means of checking judicial activism. Richard Wirthlin, long-time 
political strategist and aid to President Ronald Reagan calls the Article V 
convention approach—as it relates to the issue of a federal marriage 
amendment—”cleaner, more manageable, and somewhat more likely to 
succeed than attempting to push it through Congress.”29
It behooves all scholars, governmental officials, and citizens to re-
 29. See Appendix B (Letter from Richard Wirthlin to Arthur H. Taylor, the author, dated 
June 6, 2005). 
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examine long-held fears of a convention in light of changed 
circumstances and identify those that are rational or irrational, and 
further distinguish those which are legal from those which are primarily 
political in their underpinnings. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
 
 
 
National Survey on Constitutional Change*
 
N=1,000 U.S. adults 18+ 
 
Conducted October 28 – November 1, 2005 
 
1. As you may know, a Constitutional Amendment is a change to the 
constitution of a nation or a state.  Over the years many issues have been 
discussed as possible topics for a U.S. Constitutional Amendment.  I am 
going to read you a number of topics and after each one, please tell me if 
you FAVOR or OPPOSE the proposed Constitutional Amendment.  The 
first one is . . . 
 
A. To place term limits on how long U.S. Senators or members of 
    Congress can serve 
 
 71% FAVOR (NET) 
 46%  Strongly favor 
 25% Somewhat favor 
 23%  OPPOSE (NET) 
 12%  Strongly oppose 
 11% Somewhat oppose 
 6% Not sure/Refused 
 
B. To ban abortion except to save the life of the woman 
  
 41%  FAVOR (NET) 
 30%  Strongly favor 
 12% Somewhat favor 
 52% OPPOSE (NET) 
 39%  Strongly oppose 
 13% Somewhat oppose 
 7% Not sure/Refused 
 
 
* © 2005, Harris Interactive Inc. All rights reserved. 
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 C. To define marriage in all states to be a union between a man and a     
            woman 
 
 64%  FAVOR (NET) 
 56%  Strongly favor 
 8% Somewhat favor 
 32% OPPOSE (NET) 
 22%  Strongly oppose 
 10% Somewhat oppose 
 4% Not sure/Refused 
 
 D. To specifically permit prayer at school meetings and ceremonies 
 
 67%  FAVOR (NET) 
 49%  Strongly favor 
 18% Somewhat favor 
 29% OPPOSE (NET) 
 18%  Strongly oppose 
 11% Somewhat oppose 
 4% Not sure/Refused 
 
 E. To allow non natural-born citizens to become President if they  
            have been a citizen for 20 years 
 
 39%  FAVOR (NET) 
 14%  Strongly favor 
 25% Somewhat favor 
 55% OPPOSE (NET) 
 37%  Strongly oppose 
 18% Somewhat oppose 
 7% Not sure/Refused 
 
 F. To specifically allow Congress to regulate the amount of personal  
            funds a candidate for public office can spend in a campaign 
 
 65%  FAVOR (NET) 
 44%  Strongly favor 
 21% Somewhat favor 
 29% OPPOSE (NET) 
 15%  Strongly oppose 
 14% Somewhat oppose 
 6% Not sure/Refused 
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 G. To ban the burning of a U.S. flag 
 
 49%  FAVOR (NET) 
 40%  Strongly favor 
 9% Somewhat favor 
 45% OPPOSE (NET) 
 32%  Strongly oppose 
 13% Somewhat oppose 
 6% Not sure/Refused 
 
 H. To lower the drinking age to 18 years old 
  
 23%  FAVOR (NET) 
 12%  Strongly favor 
 10% Somewhat favor 
 75% OPPOSE (NET) 
 64%  Strongly oppose 
 11% Somewhat oppose 
 2% Not sure/Refused 
 
 I. To require the U.S. Congress and President to always adopt a  
           balanced budget 
 
 76%  FAVOR (NET) 
 49%  Strongly favor 
 27% Somewhat favor 
 18% OPPOSE (NET) 
 8%  Strongly oppose 
 11% Somewhat oppose 
 6% Not sure/Refused 
 
 J. To limit or prohibit citizens from owning certain types of guns 
  
 52%  FAVOR (NET) 
 36%  Strongly favor 
 16% Somewhat favor 
 44% OPPOSE (NET) 
 31%  Strongly oppose 
 13% Somewhat oppose 
 5% Not sure/Refused 
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 K. To prohibit Congress from passing any laws affecting state  
             governments unless they provide the funding required to pay for  
             those laws 
 
 69%  FAVOR (NET) 
 42%  Strongly favor 
 27% Somewhat favor 
 22% OPPOSE (NET) 
 10%  Strongly oppose 
 12%  Somewhat oppose 
 9% Not sure/Refused 
 
 L. To require that judges interpret the laws and not write them 
 
 74%  FAVOR (NET) 
 56%  Strongly favor 
 18% Somewhat favor 
 20% OPPOSE (NET) 
 11%  Strongly oppose 
 9% Somewhat oppose 
 7% Not sure/Refused 
 
 M. To replace the Bill of Rights with an internationally recognized        
             set of citizen standards 
 
 13%  FAVOR (NET) 
 5% Strongly favor 
 8% Somewhat favor 
 78% OPPOSE (NET) 
 61%  Strongly oppose 
 16%  Somewhat oppose 
 9% Not sure/Refused 
 
2. Which ONE of these topics do you FAVOR the MOST? 
 
 14% Permit school prayer 
 14% Ban abortion 
 13% Protect marriage between a man and a woman 
 10%  Gun ownership restrictions 
 9%  Require a balanced Federal budget 
 7% Require judges to interpret the laws and not write them 
 5% Lower the drinking age to 18 years old 
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 4% Make Congress fund the laws they pass that affect state  
   governments 
 4% Congressional term limits 
 4% Ban flag burning 
 4% Campaign finance limits 
 2% Allow foreign-born citizens to become President 
 2% Replace the Bill of Rights 
 8% NOT SURE/NONE OF THESE/REFUSED 
 
3. Which ONE of these topics do you OPPOSE the MOST? 
 
 18% Ban abortion 
 18% Lower the drinking age to 18 years old 
 14% Replace the Bill of Rights 
 9% Allow foreign-born citizens to become President 
 8%  Gun ownership restrictions 
 8% Protect marriage between a man and a woman 
 4% Ban flag burning 
 3% Require judges to interpret the laws and not write them 
 3% Permit school prayer 
 2% Make Congress fund the laws they pass that affect state  
                       governments 
 2%  Require a balanced Federal budget 
 1% Congressional term limits 
 1% Campaign finance limits 
 8% NOT SURE/NONE OF THESE/REFUSED 
 
4. As you also might know, there are two different methods of 
approaching a U.S. Constitutional Amendment.  One way is for a bill to 
pass both the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives.  The second 
method is for a Constitutional Convention to be called by the state 
legislatures, and for that Convention to propose one or more 
amendments. 
 
Regardless of which of the two methods are used, the amendment still 
must be approved by three-fourths of the states.  If you favor an 
amendment do you prefer that it is proposed by Congress, by a 
Convention, or does it not matter to you? 
 
 60% No preference/Does not matter 
 23% Prefer Congress 
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 12%  Prefer Convention 
 5% Not sure/Refused 
 
5. As you may know, a Constitutional Convention to amend the U.S. 
Constitution has never previously been called.  Just based on this 
information, do you FAVOR or OPPOSE a Convention or does this 
information make no difference? 
 
 61% Makes no difference 
 17% Favor 
 17% Oppose 
 4% Not sure/Refused 
 
6. Still thinking about a Convention, I am going to read you the 
opinions of two people, let’s call them Smith and Jones.  After I read 
both statements, please tell me which ONE comes CLOSEST to your 
own opinion. 
 
Smith is concerned that a Convention will take up controversial or 
extreme issues and allow the participants to propose any amendment 
with just over a 50 percent vote of support among participants.  For this 
reason he OPPOSES a Convention. 
 
Jones says that it doesn’t matter what topics are discussed or what 
amendments are proposed because any amendment still requires the vote 
of three-fourths of the state legislatures in order to become law.  He 
FAVORS a Convention as the only way to allow important and needed 
Constitutional Amendments to be voted on by the states. 
 
Is your opinion closer to . . . 
 
 54% Jones, you favor a Convention 
 36% Smith, you oppose a Convention 
 10%  Not sure/Refused 
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7. Recalling that three-fourths of the state legislatures must still 
approve any amendment to the U.S. Constitution before it actually 
becomes law, do you still OPPOSE a Convention, are you more 
undecided, or do you now FAVOR a Convention? 
 
 Base: Oppose Convention (Smith) (n=361)
 44% Still oppose a Convention 
 43% More undecided 
 9% Now favor a Convention 
 5% Not sure/Refused 
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APPENDIX B 
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